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The United States Supreme Court's Indecision in
Green Tree Financial Corporation v. Bazzle:
A Class Act
I. INTRODUCTION
For several years, practitioners have questioned whether the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) permits class arbitration where a contract's arbitration clause is arguably
silent on the issue.' Far from resolving this question, the United States Supreme
Court in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle
2 indicated how divided the Court is
on the propriety of class arbitrations under arbitration agreements, as well as the
roles of the trial court and arbitrator in determining whether a class should be
certified Justice Breyer's plurality opinion indicated that the arbitrator, not the
court, should determine whether a particular arbitration agreement permits class
arbitration.4 Chief Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, argued in his dissenting
opinion that the courts should interpret the contract between the parties to determine
the availability of class procedures.5
Green Tree leaves many questions unanswered with respect to class
arbitrations. After Green Tree, courts have felt compelled to submit the question
of whether a particular arbitration agreement permits class arbitration to an
arbitrator.6 Part II of this paper recounts the facts and procedural history of Green
Tree and Lackey v. Green Tree Financial Corp.
7 Part HI examines the Supreme
1. See Robert P. Davis et al., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle: The Uncertain Fate of Class
Arbitration, 3 MEALEY's LITIGATION REPORT: CLASS ACTIONS, July 17, 2003, at 1 (explaining that
many practitioners hoped Green Tree would answer the question of whether the Federal Arbitration Act
permits class arbitrations under agreements that do not address class arbitrations).
2. 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003).
3. Compare Green Tree, 123 S. Ct. at 2408 (Breyer, J.) (holding that the arbitrator should make
the initial determination of whether an agreement permits class arbitration), with Green Tree, 123 S.
Ct. at 2408 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (arguing that it is proper for the Supreme
Court of South Carolina to declare, as a matter of state law, that class arbitration is permitted under
agreements that do not expressly forbid the practice) and with Green Tree, 123 S. Ct. 2402 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) (arguing that state substantive law does apply to the inquiry, but that the Green Tree
contracts were so unambiguous in prohibiting class arbitration by its terms that the FAA enforces the
agreement and the Supreme Court of South Carolina was in error in determining the contracts to be
silent on the issue).
4. Green Tree, 123 S. Ct. at 2408.
5. Id. at 2409 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
6. See, e.g., Pedcor Mgmt. Co., Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Tex., 343 F.3d 355, 359
(5th Cir. 2003) (stating that "[tihe clarity of Green Tree's holding-that arbitrators are supposed to
decide whether an arbitration agreement forbids or allows class arbitration-leaves [the court] to decide
only whether the instant case is sufficiently analogous to Green Tree to come within its rule").
7. 330 S.C. 388, 498 S.E.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1998).
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Court of South Carolina's analysis in Bazzle v. Green Tree Financial Corp.,' to
include the court's application of state substantive law to the arbitration agreement.
Part IV evaluates the various opinions in the United States Supreme Court's
resolution of Green Tree. Finally, Part V illustrates the future challenges in class
arbitrations in the wake of Green Tree, including the extent to which state
substantive law continues to control the interpretation of arbitration agreements.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Green Tree arose from contract disputes between defendant Green Tree
Financial Corporation (Green Tree), a consumer credit lender, and its customers.9
In 1997, plaintiffs Lynn and Burt Bazzle filed an action in South Carolina state
court complaining that Green Tree failed to provide its customers with a disclosure
form required under South Carolina law, thereby entitling the Bazzles to damages.'°
The Bazzles sought class certification for their claims." In response, Green Tree
sought to stay the court proceedings and compel arbitration pursuant to the
arbitration clause in the Bazzles' loan agreement.'2 The trial court certified the
class and at the same time ordered arbitration. 3
The contract between Green Tree and the Bazzles contained the following
arbitration clause:
ARBITRATION-All disputes, claims, or controversies arising
from or relating to this contract or the relationships which result
from this contract... shall be resolved by binding arbitration by
one arbitrator selected by us with the consent of you. This
arbitration contract is made pursuant to a transaction in interstate
commerce, and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act
at 9 U.S.C. section 1 ... THE PARTIES VOLUNTARILY AND
KNOWINGLY WAIVE ANY RIGHT THEY HAVE TO A
JURY TRIAL, EITHER PURSUANT TO ARBITRATION
UNDER THIS CLAUSE OR PURSUANT TO COURT
ACTION BY U.S. (AS PROVIDED HEREIN) .... The parties
agree and understand that the arbitrator shall have all powers
provided by the law and the contract. These powers shall include
all legal and equitable remedies, including, but not limited to,
8. 351 S.C. 244, 569 S.E.2d 349 (2002).
9. Green Tree, 123 S. Ct. at 2404.
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money damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief. 4
Pursuant to the arbitration clause and the trial court's order compelling
arbitration, Green Tree selected an arbitrator with the Bazzles' consent.' s The
arbitrator administered the proceedings as a class arbitration and ultimately awarded
the class plaintiffs $10,935,000 in damages. 6 Upon the trial court's confirmation
of the arbitrator's award, Green Tree appealed to the South Carolina Court of
Appeals claiming, inter alia, that class arbitration was legally impermissible under
the parties' agreement. 7
Earlier, another set of plaintiffs, the Lackeys and the Buggses, had filed a
similar lawsuit against Green Tree in South Carolina. 8 Like the Bazzles, the
Lackey plaintiffs moved to certify a class, and Green Tree responded with a motion
to compel arbitration. 9 Ultimately, the parties in the Lackey suit chose the same
arbitrator as was selected for the Bazzles.2 ° In Lackey, however, it was the
arbitrator who certified a class.2 After the arbitrator entered an award for the
Lackey plaintiffs, Green Tree appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals
claiming, as with their appeal from the Bazzle judgment, that arbitration was
impermissible under the relevant arbitration clause.22
The Supreme Court of South Carolina consolidated Green Tree's appeals from
both the Bazzle and Lackey judgments and withdrew the two cases from the court
of appeals.23 After recognizing that "[t]he United States Supreme Court had not
addressed the FAA's impact on class-wide arbitration," '24 the court held that under
South Carolina law, "class-wide arbitration may be ordered when the arbitration
agreement is silent if it would serve efficiency and equity, and would not result in
prejudice." 5  Applying this holding, the court determined that the arbitration
clauses at issue were silent as to class arbitration and, thus, class arbitration was
permissible under the agreements.26 The United States Supreme Court subsequently
14. Id. at 2405 (omissions in original).
15. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402, 2405 (2003).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Lackey v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 330 S.C. 388, 393, 498 S.E.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1998).
19. Id.
20. Green Tree, 123 S. Ct. at 2406.
21. Id. at 2406. Of some significance, at least in the eyes of the United States Supreme Court, is
the fact that the arbitrator certified the Lackey class after the state circuit court certified the Bazzle
class. Id. at 2405-06.
22. Id.
23. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 351 S.C. 244, 249,569 S.E.2d 349,351 (2002), vacated by
123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003).
24. Id. at 257, 569 S.E.2d at 356.
25. Id. at 266, 569 S.E.2d at 360.
26. Id. at 267, 569 S.E.2d at 361.
2004]
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granted certiorari "to consider whether [the South Carolina Supreme Court's]
holding is consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act."27 In a plurality opinion, the
Court vacated the opinion of the state supreme court and remanded the matter for
the arbitrator to make his own independent determination of whether class
arbitration is permissible under the parties' contracts. 28 By vacating the Supreme
Court of South Carolina's opinion and remanding the matter to the arbitrator, the
United States Supreme Court failed to reach the main issues presented on appeal.29
III. THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS
On appeal to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, Green Tree argued that the
trial court and arbitrator did not adhere to the terms of the arbitration agreement
when they permitted the cases to proceed as class arbitrations.3" Green Tree argued
that the certification of a class in each of the proceedings below violated the Federal
Arbitration Act' in that the express terms of the arbitration agreement did not
contemplate class arbitration.3 2 The Bazzles and Lackeys argued that, far from
prohibiting class arbitrations, the arbitration agreements were silent on the issue,
and therefore, the FAA was not violated where the terms of the agreement were not
violated.3
The Supreme Court of South Carolina began its analysis from the proposition
that in cases where an arbitration agreement is silent on the issue of class
arbitration, the United States Supreme Court has not issued any "binding precedent
that [the South Carolina Supreme Court] is obligated [to] follow."34 The court
noted that it had not previously considered whether class-wide arbitration may be
27. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402, 2406 (2003).
28. Id. at 2408.
29. See id. (holding that the arbitrator must first interpret the parties' contract to determine
whether it permits class arbitration).
30. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 351 S.C. 244, 257, 569 S.E.2d 349, 355 (2002), vacated by
123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003).
31. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2000) (providing that "[a] written provision in any maritime transaction
or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such
a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2).
32. Bazzle 351 S.C. at 257, 569 S.E.2d at 355.
33. Green Tree, 123 S. Ct. at 2406.
34. Bazzle, 351 S.C. at 257,569 S.E.2d at 356. The Supreme Court of South Carolina noted that
the United States Supreme Court had the opportunity to address how the FAA views class arbitration
where the contract between the parties is silent on the issue in the matter of Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1 (1984). The Court in Southland ultimately declined to address the FAA issue, as did the
Court in Green Tree. Id.
[Vol. 55: 489
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ordered where the agreement is silent on the issue" and thus proceeded to review
the approaches other jurisdictions had taken under similar circumstances.36 The
court recognized two distinct approaches: the "Seventh Circuit Approach,"
followed by many federal courts, and the "California Approach."37
Under the "Seventh Circuit Approach," several federal courts have held that
permitting class arbitration would not be in "accordance with the terms" of an
arbitration agreement that is silent on the issue of class proceedings. 3 Perhaps
revealing the court's true concern with arbitration agreements under the FAA, the
state supreme court noted that the federal courts prohibiting class arbitration failed
to consider whether the arbitration agreement was adhesive and thus not a
negotiated term warranting strict enforcement.39
Under the "California Approach," courts have permitted class-wide arbitrations
where the arbitration agreement is found to be adhesive." In Keating v. Superior
Court,41 the California Supreme Court gave considerable weight to the policy
interests behind class proceedings, and reasoned with respect to class arbitration:
"If the right to a classwide proceeding could be automatically eliminated in
relationships governed by adhesion contracts through the inclusion of a provision
for arbitration, the potential for undercutting these class action principles, and for
chilling the effective protection of interests common to a group, would be
substantial." '42
The Supreme Court of South Carolina also noted that California's courts have
held that section 4 of the FAA "contemplated a petition before a district court and
application of the federal rules of civil procedure. 43 Thus the FAA does not
preempt a state procedure that furthers "the effectuation of the federal law's
objectives" of enforcing arbitration.44
Turning to South Carolina law, the state supreme court reaffirmed the notion
that "general principles of state law apply to arbitration clauses governed by the
35. Id. at 262, 569 S.E.2d at 358.
36. Id. at 258-61, 569 S.E.2d at 356-58.
37. Id. at 257, 569 S.E.2d at 356.
38. Id. at 258, 569 S.E.2d at 356 (citing Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., Inc., 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir.
1995); McCarthy v. Providential Corp., No. C94-0627 FMS, 1994 WL 387852 (N.D. Cal. July 19,
1994); Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Disc. Co., 828 F. Supp. 63 (D. Minn. 1993)).
39. Bazzle, 351 S.C. at 259, 569 S.E.2d at 356.
40. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 351 S.C. 249, 259,569 S.E.2d 349,357 (2002), vacated by
123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003) (citing Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192 (1982), rev"d in part on other
grounds by Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)).
41. 645 P.2d 1192 (1982).
42. Keating, 645 P.2d at 1207.
43. Bazzle, 351 S.C. at 261, 569 S.E.2d at 358.
44. Id. at 261, 569 S.E.2d at 358 (citations omitted).
2004]
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FAA."45 The court noted that class arbitration is not prohibited by any state statutes
or case law,46 and that the court "strongly favors arbitration."4 7 The Supreme Court
of South Carolina chose to side with the California courts and reasoned with respect
to the Green Tree contracts that the arbitration clauses were indeed silent on class
arbitration.48 Further, in such circumstances, class arbitration may be ordered "if
it would serve efficiency and equity, and would not result in prejudice." 9
According to the court, such principles of state law provide an adequate and
independent state ground upon which to order arbitration under the FAA."0
IV. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the core issue was whether the
FAA prohibits class arbitration where the arbitration agreement does not address the
issue.5' As a preliminary matter, Green Tree persisted in arguing that their contracts
were not silent on the issue of class arbitration. 2 It is at this point that the Court
failed to fulfill the hopes of those who looked to Green Tree to decide whether the
FAA permits class arbitration under an agreement that does not specifically prohibit
class arbitration. 3 The Court instead disagreed with the South Carolina courts'
determinations that the contracts were silent on the issue of class arbitration. 4 Yet
even in this decision, the Court found difficulty in reaching consensus.
The Chief Justice, joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, dissented on the
ground that they interpreted the arbitration agreements to preclude class
arbitration. 5 The dissenting plurality concluded that the determination of whether
class arbitration is permitted is one for the courts as a matter of contract
45. Id. at 262, 569 S.E.2d at 358 (quoting Munoz v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 343 S.C. 531, 539,
542 S.E.2d 360, 364 (2001) (citations omitted)).
46. Bazzle, 351 S.C. at 265,569 S.E.2d at 360.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 263, 569 S.E.2d 349, 359.
49. Id. at 266, 569 S.E.2d at 360.
50. Id. at 265, 569 S.E.2d at 360.
51. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402, 2404 (2003).
52. Id. at 2406.
53. Interestingly, many practitioners expected the United States Supreme Court to grant certiorari
in W. Va. ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger 567 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1087 (2002).
In Berger, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held adhesive contract provisions that "impose
unreasonably burdensome costs upon or ... have a substantial deterrent effect upon a person seeking
to enforce and vindicate rights... or to obtain statutory or common-law relief and remedies ... under
state law that exists for the benefit and protection of the public are unconscionable." Id. at 282. The
United States Supreme Court declined certiorari on the issue of whether the Federal Arbitration Act
preempted West Virginia's substantive law as applied in the state court's ruling. Berger, 537 U.S.
1087.
54. Green Tree, 123 S. Ct. at 2408.
55. Id. at 2410-11.
[Vol. 55: 489
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interpretation,56 and that the Supreme Court of South Carolina erred by not giving
effect to the terms "us," "tyou" "we," and "this contract" in determining whether the
agreement precluded class arbitration.57 The Chief Justice concluded that "the FAA
does not prohibit parties from choosing to proceed on a class-wide basis," but that
in Green Tree, "the parties simply did not so choose."58
Justice Breyer, joined in his plurality opinion by Justices Scalia, Souter, and
Ginsberg, found the language of the arbitration agreements more ambiguous than
in the Chief Justice's reading.59 Under Justice Breyer's analysis, the permissibility
of class arbitration cannot be decided by the literal terms of the Green Tree
contracts.6° While Justice Breyer's plurality agreed that state law, not federal law,
normally governs such contract interpretation issues,6' the plurality found that the
very question of whether the contracts forbid class arbitration constituted a
"dispute[], claim[], or controvers[y] arising from or relating to [the Green Tree]
contract."62 The contracts thus required the submission of this dispute to
arbitration.63
Justice Breyer concluded that the question of whether the arbitration agreement
itself forbids class arbitration is not the type of question that is appropriate for a
court to answer in its role as gatekeeper." "Rather the relevant question.., is what
kind of arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to. That question does not concern
a state statute or judicial procedures."65 Justice Breyer thus thought the question of
what kind of arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to was subject to arbitration
itself as a dispute arising under the parties' contract. Under the assumption that the
arbitrator did not make an independent6 interpretation of the contract to determine
if the arbitration clause precluded class proceedings,67 Justice Breyer's plurality,
joined by Justice Stevens, thought it necessary to remand the matter to the arbitrator
before addressing any of the other issues on appeal.6
56. Id. at 2409.
57. Id. at 2410.
58. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402, 2411 (2003).
59. Id. at 2406.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2407.
63. Id.
64. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402, 2407 (2003).
65. Id. (emphasis in original)
66. Arguably, the arbitrator had made an independent finding, confirmed by the orders of the state
circuit court, that the arbitration clauses were silent on the issue of class arbitration. The plurality
opinion of the Court, however, reasoned that the arbitrator's decision was tainted because the arbitrator
was already aware of the state circuit court's position on the permissibility of class arbitration under
the contract.
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Ultimately, Justice Stevens' opinion gave Justice Breyer's plurality opinion
enough votes to vacate the Supreme Court of South Carolina's decision and to
remand the matter to the arbitrator.69 Yet, Justice Stevens' opinion only concurred
with Justice Breyer's opinion to the extent that Justice Stevens wanted a
"controlling judgment of the Court."70 Justice Stevens reasoned, however, that
nothing in the FAA prevents the South Carolina courts from determining that class
arbitrations are permissible as a matter of state law where the arbitration agreement
does not prohibit them, and that the Green Tree agreements were silent on the
issue.7
Justice Stevens only went so far as to say, "[a]rguably the interpretation of the
parties' agreement should have been made in the first instance by the arbitrator,
rather than the court."72 Justice Stevens reasoned that "[b]ecause the decision to
conduct a class-action arbitration was correct as a matter of law, and because
[Green Tree] has merely challenged the merits of that decision without claiming that
it was made by the wrong decisionmaker," remanding the case was unnecessary.73
V. CLASS ARBITRATION LAW, POST-GREEN TREE
The "core" issue on appeal in Green Tree-whether the FAA permits class
arbitration where the agreements are silent on the matter-is still unclear. Even less
certain, in light of the Court's divided opinions in Green Tree, is whether the FAA
permits a state court to refuse to enforce an arbitration clause prohibiting class
arbitration on the grounds that the state's contract law holds such an agreement to
be adhesive and unconscionable. As a practical matter, the United States Supreme
Court's opinion has two significant effects on South Carolina's arbitration law and
on companies drafting contracts under this law.74
First, in terms of arbitration law, it seems clear that the only precedent set by
Green Tree is that state courts are deprived of any gatekeeper role that they may
have previously enjoyed with respect to whether a particular arbitration agreement
is silent on class arbitration.75 Though lower courts have had few opportunities
since the June 23, 2003, opinion to consider its effect, the United States Court of




72. Id. at 2408 (emphasis added).
73. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402, 2408 (2003).
74. Though the effects of the Green Tree opinion are discussed with a particular view towards
South Carolina practice, the holding of Green Tree will bear the same effects in every American
jurisdiction where the contract in dispute falls under the FAA.
75. See Green Tree, 123 S. Ct. at 2408-09.
[Vol. 55: 489
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Management Co., Inc. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Personnel of Texas.76
In Pedcor, various employer self-funded Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) plans brought suit against North American Indemnity (NAI) for
breach of reinsurance contracts with the plans.77 Each of the reinsurance contracts
contained an arbitration clause that required "any dispute between the parties hereto
in connection with the Agreement [to] be submitted to arbitration."" The
arbitration agreement did not contain any express provisions regarding class
arbitration." After denying NAI's motion to dismiss the suit, the trial court issued
an order certifying a class in the action." Pedcor appealed the certification order,
arguing that the court erred in permitting class arbitration under the contracts.
8
The Pedcor court concluded8 2 that "whether the district court applied the
correct legal standards or abused its discretion are pretermitted by recent Supreme
Court precedent."8" After recognizing that the outcome of Green Tree was a
plurality opinion, the Pedcor court decided to "look to 'that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds."'" In so
doing, the Pedcor court viewed Justice Stevens' opinion in Green Tree as
concurring only to the extent that an arbitrator "should be the first one[] to interpret
the parties' agreement."8" The Pedcor court stated that the rationale of Justice
Breyer's opinion, as supported by Justice Stevens, "substantially guide[d]" its
decision to vacate the certification order and remand the case to the district court
either to proceed with the action as filed or to have an arbitrator decide whether to
certify a class.8n
Turning to the narrowest grounds on which Justice Stevens concurred in Justice
Breyer's opinion, as the Fifth Circuit did in Pedcor, the only binding precedent that
76. 343 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2003).
77. Id. at 357.




82. Interestingly, the Pedcor court was critical of the United States Supreme Court's analysis in
Green Tree. Specifically, the Pedcor court noted that "even if the South Carolina court's holding is
'flawed on its own terms,' it is unclear why the [United States Supreme Court] would explore this issue
if its ultimate conclusion was that a court, regardless of whether its interpretation of the law is right or
wrong, is simply the wrong decision-maker." Pedcor Mgmt. Co., Inc. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations
Pers. of Tex., 343 F.3d 355, 360 (5th Cir. 2003). The Pedcor court seemed unclear as to the proper role
of a trial court in interpreting whether arbitration agreements forbid class arbitration after Green Tree.
The court ultimately concluded that "it should not be necessary for a court to decide initially whether
an arbitration agreement clearly forbids class arbitration." Id.
83. Id. at 358.
84. Id. (quoting Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 64 F.3d 184, 189 (5th Cir. 1995)
(internal citations omitted)).
85. Pedcor, 343 F.3d at 359.
86. Id. at 395, 363.
20041
9
Eckard: The United States Supreme Court's Indecision in Green Tree Financ
Published by Scholar Commons, 2004
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
resulted from Green Tree is that trial courts must submit to arbitration the question
of whether arbitration as a class is permitted under any given contract.
The second effect of Green Tree will likely manifest in the drafting of future
arbitration agreements. In drafting arbitration agreements into their contracts,
Green Tree should cause larger companies to reconsider whether their agreements
should remain silent on class arbitrations. Commentators have already begun to
predict that, in light of the Court's divided decision, attorneys will begin to
expressly prohibit class arbitration in all of their contracts.8 7 Such a practice seems
inevitable in light of the fact that the Supreme Court of South Carolina has ruled
that absent express prohibition, class arbitration is to be permitted,88 while the
United States Supreme Court was too divided in its opinion to declare the FAA's
position on the state law one way or the other.89
In the now vacated state opinion, the Supreme Court of South Carolina
discouraged the practice of expressly precluding class arbitration, stating,
"[allthough this present case does not raise this question, we note that preclusion
of class-wide or consolidated arbitration in an adhesion contract, even if explicit,
undermines principles favoring expeditious and equitable case disposition absent
demonstrated prejudice to the drafter of the adhesive contract."90 Assuming Green
Tree and its progeny prompt more companies to expressly prohibit class arbitrations
in their contracts, the question becomes to what extent the FAA will permit South
Carolina and like-minded states to invalidate the arbitration agreements that state
laws deem adhesive, thereby allowing normal class action procedures to be invoked.
This question is less clear in the wake of the divided opinions of Green Tree.
A recent Illinois case" raises these concerns. If considered on appeal,
Hutcherson may force the United States Supreme Court to clarify the FAA's role
in state arbitration proceedings. In Hutcherson, the court considered the
enforceability of a credit card company's inclusion of an arbitration clause in its
amended credit card agreement.92 The plaintiffs brought a class action against the
defendant credit card company and affiliates, and the defendants moved to stay the
proceedings and compel arbitration.93 The trial court denied the motion, and the
defendants appealed to the Illinois Court of Appeals for the First District, Third
Division.94
87. Davis et al., supra note 1, at 6-7.
88. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 351 S.C. 244, 266, 569 S.E.2d 349, 360, 363 (2002),
vacated by 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003).
89. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402, 2407 (2003).
90. Bazzle, 351 S.C. at 266 n.21, 569 S.E.2d at 360 n.21.
91. Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 793 N.E.2d 886 (Il1. App. Ct. 2003).
92. Id. at 887-88.




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss3/7
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the amendment to their agreement, adding
an arbitration clause, was "unenforceable because it [was] both procedurally and
substantively unconscionable.""5  Though the appellants' arguments related
primarily to the process of amending an existing contract to include an arbitration
clause, and thus do not correspond directly with Bazzle, the Hutcherson plaintiffs
did argue that their arbitration agreement, which expressly prohibited class
arbitration, was substantively unconscionable because the clause "impermissibly
bars them from pursuing their rights in a class action."
96
Applying Arizona law, the Illinois Court of Appeals found that Arizona courts
had not addressed this issue, and thus surveyed otherjurisdictions. The court began
by looking at the cases relied upon by the appellants, including a recent Alabama
Supreme Court decision97 which "held an arbitration agreement precluding class
actions. . . unconscionable 'because it is a contract of adhesion that restricts the
[plaintiffs] to a forum where the expense of pursuing their claim far exceeds the
amount in controversy.""''9 The court also looked at the opinion in Szetela v.
Discover Bank,99 where the California Supreme Court found an arbitration
agreement prohibiting class actions substantively unconscionable because, inter
alia, the clause violated California's public policy of"promot[ing] judicial economy
and streamlin[ing] the litigation process in appropriate cases."'"
Ultimately, the Illinois Court of Appeals examined federal authority under
which courts have upheld arbitration agreements prohibiting class arbitration on the
grounds that parties may validly contract away rights to class actions. "
1 The court
distinguished Hutcherson from the cases advanced by the appellants on the grounds
that the Hutcherson contract "provides financial protections to card holders with the
burden of costs falling primarily on SNB," and thus the court stated they "do not
find the no-class-action provision to be so one-sided or oppressive as to render the
agreement unconscionable.' 0 2
The Hutcherson opinion indicates that many jurisdictions find arbitration
agreements that deprive litigants of rights to class treatment, without substituting
95. Id. at 891.
96. Id. at 894.
97. Leonard v. Terminix Intl. Co., 854 So. 2d 529 (Ala. 2002).
98. Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 793 N.E.2d 886, 894 (I11. App. Ct. 2003) (quoting
Leonard, 854 So. 2d at 539).
99. 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (2002).
100. Id. at 868.
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other protections in their place, unconscionable and void against public policy.10 3
The United States Supreme Court has not yet declared whether the FAA precludes
state courts from considering such an analysis. The Supreme Court will eventually
be forced to interpret the FAA's effect on applying substantive state contract law
to arbitration agreements, particularly in the context of prohibiting class arbitration.
Until then, state courts will face the dilemma of whether, and to what extent, they
may protect consumers from adhesive arbitration agreements depriving them of
their right to class proceedings.
VI. CONCLUSION
The recent United States Supreme Court decision in Green Tree did little to
clarify the questions and concerns of practitioners with respect to the availability of
class proceedings under arbitration agreements that are silent on the issue. The only
practical effect of the Court's divided opinion is that questions of whether a contract
in fact does permit class proceedings must be submitted in the first instance to the
arbitrator. As more companies expressly prohibit class arbitration in their
agreements in the wake of Green Tree, the Supreme Court of South Carolina must
address the concerns raised in note twenty-one of Bazzle: Will an adhesive
arbitration agreement that forbids class arbitration be void on grounds of South




103. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
104. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 351 S.C. 244, 266 n. 21, 569 S.E.2d 349, 360 n.21 (2002),
vacated by 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003).
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